Trade and Value Chains · Editorial
Two Railways, One Copperbelt: The New Scramble for African Minerals
Africa INSIGHTS Editorial · Sep 2026
Washington and Beijing are financing competing rail corridors to move the same African copper and cobalt to different oceans. The winner will shape who controls Africa's mineral wealth for a generation.
Zambia's Copperbelt is having a moment few commodity regions get twice in a century. Copper prices are near record highs. The kwacha was Africa's best-performing currency in the first half of 2026, up 7.73 percent against the dollar. And two of the world's largest economic blocs are now racing to build the railway that carries that copper out.
The Lobito Corridor, backed by more than six billion dollars in combined United States and European Union commitment, runs from Angola's Atlantic coast through the Democratic Republic of Congo to Zambia's Copperbelt. It exists, explicitly, to give Western manufacturers an alternative to Chinese-controlled mineral supply chains. Four hundred kilometres east, a revived Tanzania-Zambia Railway, financed through a 1.4 billion dollar, thirty-year concession with a Chinese state contractor, is rebuilding the old Cold War-era line to Dar es Salaam. Both corridors are built to carry the identical tonnage of copper and cobalt. Neither can succeed without it.
This is not abstract geopolitics playing out at a comfortable distance from African interests. It is happening directly on top of them. Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo are not spectators to this rivalry; they are its terrain. Whichever corridor moves more mineral tonnage first will shape port fees, processing jobs, and diplomatic leverage in Lusaka and Kinshasa for a generation.
Layered on top of the corridor race is a second, equally significant shift: a wave of African governments moving to keep more of that mineral value at home. Thirteen countries, including Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and the DRC, have introduced export restrictions or beneficiation requirements on critical minerals since 2022. Zimbabwe's is the most aggressive. In February 2026, it banned all raw lithium and mineral exports outright.
The policy logic is sound. The execution is not yet there. By mid-2026, Zimbabwe had only one lithium sulphate processing plant fully operational, despite the blanket export ban already being in force. Mining analysts have been blunt about the mismatch: companies cannot switch from exporting raw ore to running beneficiation facilities overnight. It is the clearest illustration anywhere on the continent of a pattern Africa INSIGHTS research keeps finding, policy ambition arriving well before the capital, power and technical capacity needed to deliver on it.
Meanwhile, the continent's own trade architecture is gradually proving what patient, unglamorous implementation can achieve. After Nigeria formally gazetted its African Continental Free Trade Area tariff schedule in April 2025, its intra-African trade jumped twenty-one percent in a single year, from 7.47 billion dollars to 9.02 billion. That is real money moving because market access became operationally, not just legally, available. It also exposes how far AfCFTA still has to travel: of the fifty-four countries that have signed on, only around twenty-five had gazetted functioning tariff schedules by March 2026. Preferential trade is legally available almost everywhere on paper. It is practically claimable in fewer than half of member states.
AfCFTA's own Secretary-General, Wamkele Mene, has been candid that the agreement's legal foundation is essentially complete, and that the next phase depends on financing cross-border industrial projects rather than further negotiation. He has pointed specifically to a proposed lithium battery facility linking Zambia and the DRC as the kind of project that could, if built, unlock auto-sector industrialisation across the region. Whether that facility moves from proposal to construction, or joins the long list of announced African megaprojects still waiting for financial close, is one of the more consequential open questions in African trade policy today.
None of this, the corridor rivalry, the beneficiation wave, AfCFTA's uneven rollout, sits in isolation. Each connects directly to the others, and to currency risk, power availability and infrastructure financing gaps playing out across the continent at the same time. Reading them separately misses most of what actually determines who wins and who is left exporting raw ore a decade from now.
That is exactly the analysis Africa INSIGHTS Pro subscribers get in full. Our 2,000-word-plus Market Brief on this topic maps all six major African trade corridors against financing status and political risk, tracks beneficiation policy against verified processing capacity country by country, and names the ten African and global companies, and the ten African leaders, worth watching most closely as this plays out.
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